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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to develop and present a novel approach to the conflict of ethics on 
the foundation of legal theory, particularly the legal rules governing conflict of laws. The focus is 
on the conflict of ethics impacting Indigenous Americans in the context of Occidental settler 
colonialism in the Americas. This paper contains three major contributions. First, the interplay 
between Indigenous American concepts categorized as ethics in the Occident and Occidental 
ethics in a settler colonial context was assessed. Second, Occidental concepts in Roman Law and 
Saint Thomas Aquinas’ natural law was used to determine the precedence of Indigenous 
American equivalents to ethics vis-à-vis Occidental ethics in the Americas. Third, rules-based 
solutions synthetized from conflict of laws in international law were applied to conflict of ethics in 
the settler colonial context in the Americas.   
Keywords 
Cultural and epistemic racism, decoloniality, indigenous Americans, settler colonialism, sumak 
kawsay, wakohtowin. 
Resumen 
El objetivo de este artículo es desarrollar y presentar un enfoque novedoso del conflicto de 
ética sobre la base de la teoría legal, particularmente las reglas legales sobre el conflicto de 
leyes. La atención se centra en el conflicto de ética que afecta a los indígenas en el contexto 
del colonialismo en las Américas. Este artículo contiene tres contribuciones principales. 
Primero, se evaluó la interacción entre los conceptos de los indígenas categorizados como 
ética en el occidente en el contexto colonial. Segundo, los conceptos occidentales en la ley 
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romana y la ley natural de Santo Tomás de Aquino se usaron para determinar la procedencia 
de los equivalentes indígenas en las Américas. Tercero, las soluciones basadas en reglas 
sintetizadas a partir del conflicto de leyes en el derecho internacional se aplicaron al conflicto 
de ética en el contexto colonial en las Américas. 
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Racismo cultural y epistémico, descolonialidad, indígenas en las Américas, colonialismo, 
sumak kawsay, wakohtowin 
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1. Introduction 
The objective of this paper is to develop and present a novel approach to the conflict 
of ethics on the foundation of legal theory, particularly the legal rules governing conflict 
of laws. The need to address the conflict of ethics stems from the increasing 
importance of particularly the Indosphere and Sinosphere with their respective cultures 
and epistemes on the one hand, and recognition of Indigenous cultures and epistemes 
in intrastate law –highlighted by legal pluralism– and interstate law –epitomized by the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The need for 
addressing the conflict of ethics is further underlined by problems associated with the 
legality and legitimacy of settler colonial states’ sovereignty claims. 
The focus of this paper is on the conflict of ethics impacting Indigenous 
Americans.  This paper fills a gap in the literature by bringing together legal concepts 
used in solving conflicts of laws in international law, and cultural and epistemic racism 
in the context of a clash of Indigenous American concepts categorized as ethics in the 
Occident and Occidental ethics. The characteristics and dynamics of the settler 
colonialism Indigenous Americans have been subjected to cannot be assumed to be 
same as in the colonialism in Africa and Asia. In the context of the colonial experience 
of Indigenous Americans, the terms “internal colonialism” and “settler colonialism” 
have been used by, e.g., Churchill (1985, p. 35). The idiosyncrasies of settler 
colonialism impact the choice of literature in this paper. 
The term “Occident” is used instead of “the West”, because the latter needs to 
be rejected: “The West” is both ahistorical and ambiguous. E.g., “the West” ( برغمل ) 
refers to the Maghreb countries in Arabic, and “the West” (西域) has historically 
referred to Central Asia in Chinese. In this paper, the term “Occident” refers to 
societies that are founded on the Greco-Roman Heritage –including Roman Law– and 
Occidental Christianity –Roman Catholicism and Protestantism. Occidental ethics is 
understood to be ultimately founded on ancient Greek philosophical ethics that has 
been influenced by, e.g., Saint Augustine of Hippo on the basis of Occidental Christian 
theology. 
Although discrimination generally and discrimination directed against individual 
groups in particular have been studied in, e.g., Montargot and Peretti (2014, p. 187), 
and Coelho (2019, pp. 1993-1995), conflict of ethics as it relates to the incompatibility 
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of Indigenous American concepts categorized as ethics in the Occident and Occidental 
ethics with their Occidental equivalents has received limited attention. The foundations 
of Indigenous American concepts categorized as ethics in the Occident are the 
different Indigenous American cosmovisions (León-Portilla, 1983, p. 22). The original 
foundation of Occidental ethics was ancient Greek ethical philosophy (Gérard, 2012, 
p. 205), but it was reformulated and reinterpreted on the basis of Occidental Christian 
theology. 
The incompatibility of Indigenous American concepts categorized as ethics in 
the Occident and Occidental ethics are exemplified by two legitimations. First, ethics 
derived from Occidental Christianity was used to legitimize the destruction of 
Indigenous American cultures (Estrada, 2006, pp. 8-9). Second, ethics derived from 
Occidental Christianity was used to legitimize the enslavement of Indigenous 
Americans in the 15th and 16th centuries (Mayer, 2014, pp. 1128-1129). The terms 
“ethics” and (religious) “morals” are considered a purely nominalist issue, and 
consequently they are used interchangeably in this paper. 
The development of concepts dealing with conflict of ethics does not need to 
start from nothing. In international private and public law, concepts dealing with conflict 
of laws have been developed over the centuries, e.g., Salah (2010, p. 31). Two 
caveats are in place. First, the categories “ethics” and “law” are of Occidental origin 
and are thus not meaningful outside of the Occident. Second, the concepts dealing 
with conflict of laws have been developed within the confines of the Occidental legal 
families –and ultimately Roman Law– and are therefore inapplicable outside of these 
confines. Nevertheless, the concepts dealing with conflict of laws are a useful starting 
point. 
A search for the universal may effectively put pressure on Indigenous 
Americans to adopt and emphasize factors congruent with the dominant ethics –the 
Occidental ethics. This would reduce conflicts of ethics, but it also contains the seed 
of racism, and cultural and epistemic racism. 
Recognizing the multiplicity of descriptions of racism, Memmi’s (2000, p. 169) 
description is adopted for the purposes of this paper: “Racism is the generalized and 
final assigning of values to real or imaginary differences, to the accuser’s benefit and 
at his victim’s expense, in order to justify the former’s own privileges or aggression” 
(Grosfoguel, 2004, p. 315) has raised the issue of the problems with (cultural) ethnicity 
versus (biological) race. A narrow definition of racism as being about the biological 
race alone would effectively legitimize cultural (and epistemic) racism. Cultural and 
epistemic racism is about the negation (Orellana F., 2005, p. 87) or peripheralization 
(Pachón Soto, 2012, p. 47) of another culture and episteme. 
Remedying eurocentrism involves decolonial and intercultural dialogues 
between different cultures and epistemes, including the Indigenous American cultures 
and epistemes (Quijano, 2007, pp. 106-107). The phenomenon of cultural genocide –
ethnocide means that Indigenous Americans are prevented from using, developing 
and teaching their own cultures– taking advantage of the institutional and legal power 
structures of the state has been connected to the settler colonialism found in the 
Americas (Mako, 2012, pp. 176-180). 
This conceptual paper is divided into five sections. In order to set the stage for 
a synthesis for handling conflict of ethics, the second section addresses conflict of 
laws. In the three subsections of the second section, Roman Law and the Occidental 
legal families, international private and public law, and current force of Indigenous 
American equivalents of law are studied. In the third section, Indigenous American 
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concepts categorized as ethics in the Occident are investigated. In the fourth section, 
ways to navigate fundamentally incompatible Indigenous American and Occidental 
concepts in the field referred to as ethics in the Occident are synthetized. Additionally, 
the first section contains the Introduction and the fifth section the Conclusion. 
2. Conflict of laws 
In the aftermath of 1492, the Occident took measures that effectively prevented the 
possibility of conflict of laws by destroying the Indigenous American nations. The 
conquest and hence all subsequent actions were not only illegal and illegitimate from 
an Indigenous American perspective, but also from an Occidental Natural Law 
perspective. The efforts of Bartolomé de las Casas and Francisco de Vitoria to limit 
the encroachments on the rights of Indigenous Americans are well known albeit the 
former argued that the Indigenous Americans were inferior to the Occidentals (Rosa, 
2015, p. 260). Another person deserves to be mentioned:  Alonso de la Vera Cruz, the 
first professor of theology at the Real y Pontificia Universidad de México after the 
Spanish conquest, admitted in De dominio infidelium et justo bello that was founded 
on Natural Law developed by Saint Thomas Aquinas and ius gentium –both of 
Occidental pedigree– that the conquest of the Americas was a fait accompli in spite of 
being illegal (Westra, 2011, pp. 100-107). A fait accompli is a problematic legal 
argument in Roman Law, because theft prevents usucapio, and thus an establishment 
of a fait accompli. 
A challenge in an attempt to reduce cultural and epistemic racism is Pfordten’s 
(2012, p. 456) argument that concepts are more important in laws than norms. On the 
one hand, concepts are not universal and the use of Occidental concepts to study 
Indigenous American equivalents to ethics and law is bound to result in failure, a failure 
that could be misused in calls for universal validity of Occidental ethics and law. On 
the other hand, a focus on concepts requires scholars to understand the cultural 
context of laws. 
The work of Saint Thomas of Aquinas was founded on an Occidental 
understanding of Natural Law (Roca, 1997, p. 883), and hence his scholarship was 
limited by the Greco-Roman Heritage and Occidental Christianity. This intercultural 
critique of Saint Thomas of Aquinas’ scholarship is fundamentally different from the 
intracultural critique in, e.g., Massini-Correas (2019, p. 12). Ary (2014, pp. 542-543) 
has propounded that law both constructs and reflects the ethics in a historically 
evolved society. Saint Thomas of Aquinas’ Natural Law thus arguably had and has 
some force in the Occident and an Occidental state’s deportment vis-à-vis Indigenous 
American nations, but it had and has no legitimacy in Indigenous American nations. 
Because the criteria used for statehood were modelled on European ideas on 
political and social organization, it was difficult for Indigenous American political 
entities to be recognized as states after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The resulting 
lack of statehood is ontologically problematic when solutions for conflict of ethics are 
developed founded on the example of conflict of laws. To circumnavigate this problem, 
Indigenous American political entities –in a wide sense– are referred to as nations and 
Occidental political entities as states in this paper. 
Whereas the manifold Indigenous American conceptions and interconnections 
of what is categorized as ethics and law in the Occident differ from those found in the 
Occident concepts– including international private and public law– any assessment 
and synthesis of conflict of laws and conflict of ethics is a complex undertaking.  
Ollero’s (2002, pp. 270-271) rejection of the separation of ethics and law that has 
occurred in Occidental legal positivism suggests that Occidental categorizations are 
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not considered optimal even in the Occident. Furthermore, Estrada Ochoa (2009, pp. 
190-192) shows the complexity flowing from different categorizations. 
The failure of the Occident to submit to the –arguably only legal and legitimate– 
Indigenous American concepts of what are categorized as ethics and law in the 
Occident in the Americas in the aftermath of 1492 raises the issue of possible faults in 
the Occidental conceptualization of equality. A fundamental rejection of Indigenous 
American concepts by the settler colonists effectively prevents reciprocity between the 
Indigenous Americans and settler colonists, and this casts doubt on the settler 
colonists’ willingness to consider the Indigenous Americans as equals on the basis of 
Aristotle (Perrin, 2007, pp. 279-280). Occidentals considered the Indigenous American 
inferior using Aristotle’s conceptualization –as epitomized by Bartolomé de las Casas– 
thus purportedly legitimizing an appalling treatment of Indigenous Americans, and the 
destruction of Indigenous American cultures and epistemes in the Americas. 
The Weberian view of formal rationality that legitimizes unequal treatment 
when this is appropriate and proportionate against the backdrop of a recognized 
objective (Renner, 2010, p. 163) can result in the legitimization of racism. A recognized 
objective may very well be racist, and culturally and epistemically racist as 
demonstrated by the objectives recognized by the Occidentals in the aftermath of 
1492. The Weberian view is ethically troubling, because it suggests that racism, and 
cultural and epistemic racism can be considered rational by the Occident. 
Because of the fragmentation of critical legal studies (Oberkofler, 2006, pp. 
210-211), critical theory does not offer a promising path forward in the study of conflict 
of laws, and conflict of ethics. However, the scholarship of Bartolomé de las Casas, 
Alonso de la Vera Cruz and Francisco de Vitoria indicates that the Occident is not 
necessarily hostage to racism, and cultural and epistemic racism perpetrated against 
Indigenous Americans. To identify Occidental ethics that have not been tainted by 
political expediency and religious fanaticism, it is necessary to go back in history –to 
the Roman Empire. The principles found in Roman Law are used as an approximation 
of Occidental substantive ethics. 
2.1. Roman law and Occidental legal families 
To begin with, it is warranted to consider the influence of Roman Law in the Occident 
today. This is complicated by the historical development that gave rise to two 
Occidental legal families. The division into the common law family that encompasses 
the former of the British Empire on the one hand and the Civil Law family on the other 
hand is consequential, because only the latter unequivocally descends from Roman 
Law (Guénaire, 2001, p. 49). Common law is found in Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, 
Barbados, Belize, British Virgin Islands, most of Canada, Cayman Islands, Dominica, 
Grenada, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and most 
of the USA in the Americas. The other countries in the Americas belong to the Civil 
Law family with its roots in Roman Law. 
Although the nexus between common law and Roman Law is tenuous, 
common law has been influenced by Roman Law particularly in four ways. First, there 
was an attempt to create a uniform canon and laic law that prevented any clear 
demarcation between the two in the Middle Ages (Müller, 2006, pp. 1-16) –at a time 
when England still recognized the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Pope. Second, a 
significant influence of the Decretum Gratiani (about AD 1140) extended to the 
Anglican Church. Third, the Court of Chancery of England was established in the 
context of a wider reception of Roman Law in the Occident albeit this reception was 
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limited in England (Macnair, 2007, p. 663). Fourth, the broader classical culture and 
philosophical reception impacted also English society. 
There is disagreement in the literature regarding the strength of the influence 
of Roman Law on contemporary law in the Civil Law family. On the one hand, Villey 
(2002, p. 113), among others, has argued that there is a significant influence. On the 
other hand, Gaviria Gil (2013, p. 53) has even questioned the contemporary existence 
of a Civil Law family because of ongoing changes –among them the incorporation of 
a legal pluralism that allows for the recognition of Indigenous American laws. In the 
civil law family, there has been a significant interaction between canon law and secular 
law in addition to a nexus between ethics and Roman Law (Zimmermann, 2007, p. 9).  
The –at least initial– discussion regarding ethics versus law goes back to the 
beginnings of the Greco-Roman Heritage, specifically Aristotle (Winkel, 2015, pp. 343-
345). Later, Aristotle’s work formed the intellectual foundation for Saint Thomas of 
Aquinas and the Spanish natural law scholars in the 16th and 17th centuries (Kohler, 
1917, p. 235) –among them was Bartolomé de las Casas. 
Exclusivity is not a trait that can be associated with Roman Law. Although still 
controversially debated, there seem to have been provincial laws differing from each 
other and differing from Roman Law in the Roman Empire, and with the disintegration 
of the Roman Empire there was some degree of dynamically changing ethnic legal 
particularism in the Germanic kingdoms (Le Goff, 2008, pp. 25-28). As the Roman 
Empire disintegrated in the 4th and 5th centuries, Germanic foederati established 
effectively independent realms on (former) Roman territory. Parallel legal systems 
existed for the Germanic migrants (foederati) and Romans living in the same territory 
–a system focussing on the person– to be replaced eventually by a territorial system 
(Olivier-Martin, 2010, pp. 26-27). 
Why did the Occidentals not submit themselves to the –arguably only legal and 
legitimate– Indigenous American concepts which are categorized as law in the 
Occident in the aftermath of 1492? Apart from Occidental religious zealotry, an 
explanation can be sought in the association of legal particularism with the Occidental 
weakness that resulted in the Occident’s defeat in the Crusades and the rejection of 
legal particularism as the Renaissance gathered pace. 
Going forward, the historical template of legal particularism in and after the 
disintegration of the Roman Empire legitimizes ethical particularism from an 
Occidental perspective. Legal particularism engenders the need to devise ways to deal 
with conflict of laws. Solutions have been developed in international private and public 
law. 
2.2. International private and public law 
Emanuelli (2010, p. 2) has observed that the philosophical foundation of international 
relations has its roots in the Greco-Roman Heritage. Gschwend (2009, p. 52) has 
noted that the foundation of human rights law can be found in the work done in the 
Faculty of Law at the University of Salamanca in the 15th century. The refusal to grant 
sovereignty to Indigenous nations (Emanuelli, 2010, pp. 245-247) –a stance that has 
been criticized in the literature (Fox-Decent and Dahlman, 2015, pp. 532-533)– may 
be interpreted as corroboration for cultural and epistemic racism in extant international 
public law. Ingrained in human rights law is a discriminatory cognitive elitism that 
contains the view that cultures and epistemes are unequal, because the place of 
humans in Nature follows the Occidental view that is fundamentally incompatible with, 
e.g., Sumak Kawsay. 
JÜRGEN POESCHE                                                                                                                           Conflict of Ethics: Indigenous Americans and Settler Colonists 
Eunomía. Revista en Cultura de la Legalidad. ISSN 2253-6655 
                   Nº. 18, abril 2020 – septiembre 2020, pp. 29-47. DOI: https://doi.org/10.20318/eunomia.2020.5262 
 
 
35 
An attempt to address cultural and epistemic racism in international private law 
and international public law within the Occidental confines needs to consider legal 
history and legal theory. Hans Kelsen’s legal positivism effectively renders enforceable 
law a product of the extant societal power structures. If these societal power structures 
are illegal or illegitimate for, e.g., historical reasons, then the enforceable law becomes 
a tool of injustice and oppression, including cultural and epistemic racism. If an 
exploitation of law for injustice and oppression is to be avoided, then one of four 
stratagems can be pursued within the confines of the Occidental culture and episteme. 
First, positive law tainted by injustice and oppression is quashed, and the status quo 
prior to the subversion is reinstated –the year 1492 would represent a tentative 
watershed. Second, Natural Law could be resorted to– the year 1492 would again 
represent a tentative watershed. Third, Customary Law could be broadened to 
encompass Indigenous American concepts categorized as law in the Occident. Fourth, 
the focus could be on processual norms particularly in the forms of democratic, 
Habermasian and Rawlsian processes instead of substantive norms –the issue here 
would be that this would encourage genocide and cultural genocide as a way to 
achieve democratic legitimation. 
From the standpoint of legal history and particularly legal theory, international 
private law and international public law are distinct. It is ultimately impossible to 
delineate international private law from international public law as the result of 
international private law relying heavily on attributes of the legal systems in question 
that are (also) part of public law, e.g., interstate treaties governing matters governing 
matters related to private law. 
In spite of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
the influence of the Indigenous nations in international law has not significantly 
increased, because the legal theory used in its interpretation is still the same with its 
roots in Roman Law. Albeit it is accurate that Indigenous American nations have 
gained some jurisdictional ground in international private law as a result of legal 
pluralism in several Latin America states (Díaz Ocampo and Antúnez Sánchez, 2018, 
p. 59), and in international public law (Díaz Ocampo and Antúnez Sánchez, 2018, p. 
47), this is taking place against the backdrop of a continued predominance of 
Occidental law. The refusal to recognize the sovereign status of Indigenous American 
nations deprives them of a meaningful participation in the enforcement and formulation 
of international public law in particular.  In this context, reading, e.g., Becerra Ramírez 
(2017, in toto) is interesting for what is missing: The current Occidental dominance in 
international law is not seriously questioned. 
Indigenous collective rights have received attention in international public law 
only relatively recently –the first generation of human rights law dealt with civil and 
political rights, the second with economic and social rights, and the third with collective 
rights (Quintana Osuna and Góngora Maas, 2017, pp. 1-2). The 2007 United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples creates the foundation in international 
law for the recognition of Indigenous American concepts categorized as ethics and law 
in the Occident. A conceptual challenge is that international law was founded on the 
dichotomy of state and individual, but groups –among them Indigenous American 
nations– were recognized only in the aftermath of the bulk of decolonization in Africa 
and Asia in the 1960s –i.e., two continents with relatively limited experiences with 
settler colonialism. 
Problems persist. Occidental political expediency is epitomized by the 1948 
United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide –a convention substantively contrived by the Occidental colonial powers.  
The protection of individual and group rights have long been contradictory as they 
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relate to cultural and epistemic diversity in international (public) law, because the 
Occident has prioritized individual rights while many Indigenous Nations have 
emphasized rights as a part of Nature –Nature encompasses spirits, animate beings, 
among them humans, and inanimate “objects”. The Occidental term “group rights” 
does therefore not grasp this fundamental contradiction. This failure suggests 
moreover that there has been a retrograde development in the Occident, because the 
Roman Empire and Roman Law accepted legal pluralism: Non-Roman legal orders 
were tolerated in the provinces (Lepelley, 1998, pp. 84-85). 
Cultural genocide targeting Indigenous American nations may include 
Indigenous American customs categorized as Customary Law in the Occident. A prime 
difference between ethics and law is that ethics can be equated with customs, and 
customs –or Customary Law– are only one source in Occidental law.  Whether a 
similar difference exists in Indigenous American nations is doubtful. If such a difference 
does not exist, then any imposition of Occidental law is also an ethical issue when 
Occidental categorizations are used. 
In international private law, Soft Law (Pereznieto Castro, 2015, pp. 795-797) 
may contain cultural and epistemic racism, but Soft Law could aösp offer an avenue 
to incorporate Indigenous concepts (Bermúdez Abreu and Quintero, 2007, p. 45). 
Realistically, this must be doubted. In view of the extant economic power structures in 
addition to asymmetries in judicial enforcement in the Americas, Soft Law favours 
Occidental laws and disadvantages Indigenous American concepts categorized as law 
in the Occident. An avenue to strengthen the position of Indigenous American 
concepts categorized as law in the Occident is the adoption of legal pluralism in 
addition to granting sovereignty to Indigenous American nations. 
The available space does not allow for a comprehensive assessment of conflict 
of laws in international private and public law. Therefore, the assessment is limited to 
the principles of nationality versus territoriality, judicial restraint, transnationalism, 
ordre public, act of state, renvoi, proximité, and ius cogens. 
In international law, the status of international law vis-à-vis domestic law is a 
contentious issue. The old-fashioned assumption that conflicts of laws solely occur in 
the context of international private law as a result of states having only one domestic 
legal system, e.g., Silva Alonso (1972, pp. 362-363), is problematic in states 
characterized by settler colonialism. Effectively, the old-fashioned assumption means 
that Indigenous American equivalents of law have been ignored by the settler colonists 
in the Americas. Theoretically, two extreme positions on a continuum are represented 
by the strict dualists and the monists with the former arguing that international law and 
domestic law are rigorously separated, and the latter maintaining that the two form a 
unity (Tuori, 2013, p. 11). Strict dualism applied to settler colonial states in the 
Americas raises challenging issues regarding nationality versus territoriality, because 
there would be one or several Indigenous American concepts categorized as law in 
the Occident in addition to Occidental law to be enforced in the same territory. In a 
situation characterized by international law, one settler colonial state law, and at least 
one Indigenous American nation’s equivalent of law, the assumptions underpinning 
strict dualism would be invalid. This leaves issues relating to the determination of the 
applicable procedural and substantive law open. 
Extant monism is problematic, because monism would introduce Occidental 
law into Indigenous American equivalents of law when the former is applied as a result 
of extant international private and public law having Greco-Roman roots (Giesen, 
2013, pp.411-438). Implementing monism on the foundation of Indigenous American 
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concepts categorized as law in the Occident would probably cause resistance among 
the settler colonists. 
A path forward would be that Indigenous American nations’ concepts 
categorized as law in the Occident are recognized in international private law and 
international public law irrespective of settler colonial state boundaries. In intrastate 
cases, conflicts of law between an Indigenous American nation’s concepts categorized 
as law in the Occident and a settler colonial state would be resolved on the foundation 
of the conflict of law rules found in international private law and international public 
law. 
A challenge in international private law is the determination of the applicable 
law. This determination may be founded on, e.g., domicile, habitual residence or 
nationality. It is thus an issue of nationality versus territoriality. Nationality versus 
territoriality is one of the most vexing challenges when Indigenous American 
equivalents of law are granted legal force in states. It is warranted to emphasize two 
points. First, both nationality and territoriality are compatible with the history of Roman 
Law, and thus legitimate in the Occident. Second, the illegality and illegitimacy of the 
conquest of the Americas by the Occidentals determined by Alonso de la Vera Cruz 
and Francisco de Vitoria in association with Roman Law means that territoriality would 
result in Indigenous American equivalents of law being the only valid law in their 
respective territories –as the territories stood before 1492. 
The challenges associated with nationality versus territoriality are highlighted 
in Bolivia: The use of Indigenous American equivalents of law have been restricted to 
Indigenous American territories (Camacho Negrete, 2012, p. 173). This means that 
Indigenous Americans living in the cities outside of their national territory are subjected 
to Occidental law. This effectively creates two classes of Indigenous Americans. 
Another challenge is that territoriality can be used to cement coloniality outside of 
current Indigenous American territories. 
Although legal coloniality has received attention in the literature (Garzón 
López, 2018, pp, 210-212), the incorporation of Indigenous American concepts 
categorized as law in the Occident into Occidental procedural and substantive law has 
proven challenging (Romero Seguel, 2012, pp. 821-823). This is not all. Because 
Occidental judges are products of the Occidental culture and episteme, it must be 
questioned, whether they possess the capabilities to apply and comprehend the 
Indigenous American concepts categorized as law in the Occident. This results in the 
phenomenon that could already be observed in the Roman Empire: The Roman legati 
Augusti, prefects, proconsuls and procurators resorted to Roman Law when called to 
adjudicate in the provinces. A complete separation of the courts is thus necessary to 
eliminate a continuation of coloniality. 
The principle of judicial restraint or abstention means that a court in Country A 
does not adjudicate matters arising in Country B when these matters are of sovereign, 
international or interstate nature. This principle could be extended to the relationship 
between states and nations thus creating firewalls between Indigenous American 
jurisdictions and Occidental jurisdictions. 
The somewhat ambiguous principle of ordre public (public policy doctrine) 
limits the application of the laws of Country B relating to Country B when adjudicated 
by courts in Country A, when the laws of Country B run counter to the accepted societal 
norms –including ethics– in Country A (Salah, 2010, p. 31). This would allow 
Indigenous American equivalents of courts to refuse to apply Occidental laws violating 
Indigenous American concepts categorized as ethics and laws in the Occident. The 
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principle of ordre public, i.e., the ethical societal values underpinning a legal system, 
is a two-edged sword. On the one hand, it limits the application of Indigenous American 
concepts categorized as law in the Occident to Indigenous American nationals or 
nations. On the other hand, it prevents the use of Occidental law on Indigenous 
American nationals or nations. 
The doctrine of act of state holds that a court in Country A does not necessarily 
refuse the adjudication of matters the government of Country A has undertaken in 
other countries (Mcinerney, 2002, p. 82). This principle safeguards that an Indigenous 
American nation does not engage in activities outside of its territory that run counter 
to the Indigenous American nation’s concepts categorized as law in the Occident. 
However, it would create an opening for settler colonial states to undermine an 
Indigenous American nation’s concepts categorized as law in the Occident in the 
Indigenous American nation’s territory thus maintaining existing coloniality. 
Transnationalism may be required to create a foundation of citizenship and 
political legitimacy of Indigenous American nations extending into several states as 
the result of colonial borders. However, e.g., Kymlicka (2004, pp. 110-111) has 
rejected transnationalism as a foundation of citizenship and political legitimacy. 
The principle of renvoi, i.e., the use of the law of Country B by a court in Country 
A, can result in (additional) unpredictability. This underlines the need for equal and 
separate Indigenous American equivalents to courts, and Occidental courts. 
The principle of le principle de proximité, i.e., the principle of the most 
significant relationship, allows for finding a solution when both Indigenous American 
concepts categorized as law in the Occident and Occidental law can be considered 
applicable. In the case of equal and separate courts, a way to resolve a jurisdictional 
dispute needs to be devised. Considering Alonso de la Vera Cruz’ and Francisco de 
Vitoria’s determination of the illegality of the conquest of the Americas, a reasonable 
solution would be to establish an Indigenous American precedence. 
An issue scarcely addressed in assessments of ius cogens, i.e., a part of 
international public law establishing ethical boundaries and from which derogation is 
forbidden, is that the procedures and substance of ius cogens are of Occidental origin, 
e.g., Virally (1966, p. 7). Whereas ius cogens can be considered the emergency break 
in international law, decolonial modifications are needed to prevent that ius cogens 
becomes a tool of a colonial fifth column. The importance of decolonial modifications 
is underlined by Eller’s (2014, pp. 191-192) finding that sovereignty and territoriality in 
law have declined as a result of globalization. 
2.3. Indigenous American equivalent of law 
A conundrum emerges when an Occidental legal scholar endeavors to study 
Indigenous American law, because the scholar erroneously presupposes that the 
criteria of what constitutes law in the Occident are also valid in Indigenous American 
nations (Barrera Rosales, 2018, pp. 328-330). Even within the Occident, problems 
arise from linguistic and terminological differences (López Rodríguez, 2018, p. 182). 
Such incompatibilities are more severe in a cross-cultural context. The concept of 
critical and discursive legal pluralism provides the foundation for the argument that 
there is a diverse authorship in law that makes Indigenous American, among others, 
authorship of law cogent (Barrera Rosales, 2018, p. 329; Díaz Ocampo and Antúnez 
Sánchez, 2018, p. 57). 
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A contentious issue between Indigenous Americans and Occidentals is the 
legality and legitimacy of the current landownership and resource ownership in the 
Americas. Alonso de la Vera Cruz’ and Francisco de Vitoria’s determination that the 
conquest of the Americas by Occidentals was illegal is key in the assessment of the 
current situation. There are three fundamental issues. First, Indigenous Americans –
contrary to Roman Law– historically do not recognize private landownership. In 
keeping with Immanuel Kant, the absence of the institution of landownership does not 
mean that the land would not belong to Indigenous Americans (Kleingeld, 1997, p. 
340). Second, Roman Law recognizes ab initio, i.e., something without owner 
becomes the finder’s property. Terra nullius has been claimed by the Occident to 
create the prerequisite for ab initio –a claim that was patently absurd in the Americas 
in 1492 and later. Third, ownership is established via possession after two years in the 
case of land (usucapio), but this is not the case if the land was stolen (Adame Goddard, 
2017, pp. 83-91). As a result, Indigenous Americans still own – in the Occidental sense 
of the term –all of the Americas. A fait accompli as tried to argue by Alonso de la Vera 
Cruz’ is not a legal argument. 
The combination of Alonso de la Vera Cruz’ and Francisco de Vitoria’s 
determination that the conquest of the Americas by Occidentals was illegal in 
combination with limitations to usucapio in Roman Law also raises the question of the 
legal status of Occidentals in the Americas since 1492. It can be argued that 
Occidentals have been illegals.  If this were the case, then it would have far-ranging 
implications in the context of settler colonialism in the Americas. E.g., all laws passed 
by settler colonists would be null and void ex tunc on the grounds that the settler 
colonists did not have legal authority to pass them. Democratic, Habermasian and 
Rawlsian processes would not change such a conclusion for two reasons. First, as 
illegals Occidentals would have no legal authority to participate in democratic, 
Habermasian and Rawlsian processes in the Americas. Second, Occidentals being in 
the majority in several states means that democracy would be illegitimate as it would 
cement an unethical situation –this is an instance of different outcomes caused by 
colonialism in Africa and Asia on the one hand, and settler colonialism in the Americas 
on the other hand. Thus, the settler colonial legal system as a societal power system, 
and ethics and Roman law part ways in spite of having the same historical roots. The 
settler colonial legal systems attempt to defend the societal status quo even in the face 
of being ethically and legally problematic. 
Indigenous American concepts categorized as ethics and law in the Occident 
do not prohibit conquests and military action per se. The wars conducted by the Aztecs 
in Mesoamerica before 1492 (Hernández Vaca, 2005, p. 117) provide evidence for 
this. The difference between Indigenous Americans and Occidentals was that the 
Indigenous Americans did not engage in significant cultural and epistemic racism as 
evidenced by the cultural and epistemic continuity evident in Mesoamerica prior to 
1492 (Hernández Vaca, 2005, p. 141-142), and the Occidentals’ cultural and epistemic 
racism –as exhibited by the destruction of the Aztec amoxcalli (libraries) (Armendáriz 
Sánchez, 2009, p. 85) –in the aftermath of 1492. The Romanization of particularly the 
societal elites in the Roman Empire (Kotula and Michalak, 1976, p. 342; Andrades 
Rivas, 2017, p. 62) can be interpreted to have laid the foundation for the Occidental 
cultural and epistemic racism that proved detrimental to Indigenous American cultures 
and epistemes in the aftermath of 1492. Simultaneously, the classical Roman Empire 
scrupulously respected the cultures and religions in the provinces (Kotula and 
Michalak, 1976, p. 342) evidencing a significant degree of tolerance. It is therefore 
possible to legitimize cultural and legal pluralism on the foundation of the Occident’s 
Greco-Roman Heritage. 
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The concept of critical and discursive legal pluralism provides a foundation for 
the assessment and finding solutions in the context of incompatible Indigenous 
American and Occidental concepts of what is categorized as ethics in the Occident.  
This can be denominated critical and discursive ethical pluralism. 
3. Indigenous American Concepts 
Which Indigenous American concepts call for critical and discursive pluralism? This 
cannot be conclusively answered in a journal paper, because there are hundreds of 
Indigenous American nations in the Americas −e.g., González Galván (1997, p. 525) 
has pointed to the resulting complexity. The historical influence of the Chichimeca and 
Toltecs in addition to the interrelationships between the Mexica nations in the 15th 
century epitomizes the complex dynamics giving rise to the Mesoamerican cultures 
and epistemes (Navarrete Linares, 2017, p. 106). When the manifold Indigenous 
American concepts categorized as ethics and law in the Occident are studied, it is 
warranted to recall that the point is not the individual differences but totally different 
premises, and this makes them impossible to study with Occidental concepts 
(incommensurability) (González Galván, 1997, pp. 527-529). Potential 
incommensurability, fear and bias need to be taken into account when 16th century 
written sources are considered –issues not fully recognized in, e.g., León-Portilla 
(2017, pp. 26-51). 
Descola (2005, pp. 402-422) has presented four ontological categories 
influencing what is categorized as ethics in the Occident: Analogism, animism, 
naturalism and totemism. Analogism –found in Mesoamerica and the Andean world– 
entails according to Descola (2005, pp. 351-401) that all beings are singular thus there 
being no meaningful distinction between different species, and that comparisons 
between beings are based on analogy. Animism –found in northern North America and 
tropical South America– holds that all beings have a spirit in spite of appearing in 
different corporealities thus gainsaying a distinction between humans and other 
beings. Naturalism –found in the Occident– presupposes that externally all beings 
descend from the same ancestor, but only humans possess ethics and souls.  
Totemism –found in North America– engenders that beings are considered on the 
basis of their physical, psychic, and moral characteristics. Descola (2005, pp. 254-
301) has concluded that solely naturalism is founded on the dichotomy humans versus 
other beings, and that analogism, animism and totemism do not give humans 
ontological exclusivity. Kawaguchi and Guimarães (2019, pp. 375-396) have 
concluded that Indigenous Americans view all beings to be part of the same culture 
with different beings having dissimilar perspectives –this is referred to as 
perspectivism. Occidentals consider nonhuman beings as exploitable objects and 
threats (Kawaguchi and Guimarães, 2019, pp. 375–396). The premises of what is 
categorized as ethics and law in the Occident are therefore different among Indigenous 
Americans and Occidentals. 
It has been concluded that –contrary to the Occidentals– Indigenous 
Americans do not focus on economic growth, and consider land communal property 
(Barrera Rosales, 2018, pp. 515-522). The notion of non-human co-essence –referred 
to as nahualli in Mesoamerica (Martínez González, 2017)– underlines the symbiosis 
of humanity and Nature among Indigenous American nations. For the Maya, the 
human body and Nature are both part of a sacred single territory (Morales Damián, 
2010, p. 279). It is warranted to recall that broad categories have a tendency of not 
being nuanced. 
An obstacle in Occidental research into Indigenous American thinking is that 
building the necessary relationships needed in the research of oral traditions is more 
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challenging than validation of research on the foundation of Occidental theory 
(Gaudet, 2014, pp. 81-83). It has been argued that Occidental journals act as 
gatekeepers defending the status quo characterized by Occidental dominance 
(Mihesuah and Wilson, 2002, p. 148) –this discourages research into, e.g., the 
manifold Indigenous American concepts categorized as ethics and law in the Occident. 
The resulting scholarly asymmetry has a tendency to effectively legitimize extant 
racism, and cultural and epistemic racism directed against Indigenous Americans. 
Now, some examples of Indigenous American concepts are discussed. 
From among the disparate Indigenous American concepts categorized as 
ethics in the Occident, concepts of the North American Cree, and South American 
Aymara, Quechua and U’wa are discussed. Instead of thinking along philosophical 
and religious lines like in the Occident, the Indigenous American U'wa, among others, 
think along spiritual and symbolic lines (Gómez Pardo, 2006, pp. 15-18). The spiritual 
and symbolic foundation of U’wa thinking effectively translates into holism of humans 
and Nature. Oil extraction cannot realistically be reconciled with, e.g., U’wa thinking –
oil is the blood of Mother Earth and its extraction kills Mother Earth (Gómez Pardo, 
2006, p. 16). The Aymara and Quechua consider humans to be parts of a holistic 
network of connections encompassing humanity and Nature (Púa Mora, 2006, pp. 53-
54). The Cree equivalent to Occidental ethics contains the concept of wakohtowin –a 
concept founded on the thought of a circle that reflects the equality of all people, and 
their capability to care for, heal, nurture and protect the land and the people (Settee, 
2011, pp. 441-447). The holism in Indigenous American thinking is effectively 
incompatible with the Occidental exploitative attitude vis-à-vis Nature. 
The equality expressed in wakohtowin is developed further in pimatisiwin.  The 
Cree foreground community life, sharing of values and wellbeing –this is reflected in 
the Cree concept of pimatisiwin– in addition to the emphasis on good relationships 
within an extended community –this is reflected in the Cree concept of miyo-
wichihtowin (Settee, 2011, pp. 437-438). Miyo-wichihtowin and pimatisiwin are 
effectively diagonally opposite to Occidental individualism. 
The claim of the existence of globally valid human rights in, e.g., Meyer (1995, 
pp. 189-194) is problematic on two counts. First, the concept of “rights” has its own 
Occidental history and does not necessarily have any meaning outside of the 
Occident. Second, the issue of individuals versus nations has been solved in 
fundamentally incompatible ways in, e.g., Cree wakohtowin and Occidental ethics. 
This underlines the need for the equality of Indigenous American and Occidental 
concepts categorized as ethics in the Occident. 
Indigenous American analogism, animism, perspectivism and totemism 
effectively contain a significant degree of equality between human and other beings.  
An equality of all beings contributes to four far-reaching conflicts of ethics. First, human 
and other beings have equal rights to the use of the land. This renders, e.g., the 
erection of fences limiting the movement of non-human beings unacceptable. Second, 
human and non-human beings have equal rights to the yield of the land. Any human 
scheme reducing the yield of the land as a result of, e.g., environmental damage is 
thus unacceptable. Third, human and other beings have concurrent, equal and parallel 
ownership rights to the land –sole human ownership is an Occidental concept. 
Depriving the land from non-human beings would amount to an unacceptable 
confiscation, because human beings cannot unilaterally impose their will on non-
human beings. Fourth, the lives and wellbeing of human and non-human beings are 
protected making any human scheme that endangers the lives and wellbeing of non-
human beings unacceptable. Conflicts of ethics arise not only in the context of the 
extraction of natural resources and the emission of compounds with detrimental effects 
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on human and non-human beings either directly or indirectly, but conflicts of ethics 
also arise in the context of the desirability of material growth. The inequality of human 
and non-human beings implicitly contained in the Occidental concept of sustainable 
development renders it a candidate for conflict of ethics. 
The concept of integration of Indigenous Americans (Salinas Burgos, 1986, p. 
504) is called into question by research into cultural and epistemic racism.  When does 
integration factually become cultural and epistemic racism? Of particular concern are 
situations when Indigenous American thinking clashes with Occidental natural 
resource extraction (Gómez Pardo, 2006, p. 17). There is thus no common ground 
needed for Habermasian or Rawlsian processes. 
4. Navigating Conflict of Ethics 
The settler colonialism in the Americas creates the challenge that there oftentimes is 
no clear territorial demarcation. This adds an additional layer of complexity. How can 
the clash between manifold Indigenous American concepts categorized as ethics and 
law in the Occident on the one hand and Occidental ethics and law on the other hand 
be navigated? There are two alternative responses. First, one of the two is determined 
superior with all the associated ethical pitfalls. Considering the illegality of the conquest 
of the Americas determined by Alonso de la Vera Cruz and Francisco de Vitoria, and 
the obvious absurdity of any terra nullius claim, it is founded to give Indigenous 
American concepts categorized as ethics and law in the Occident precedence. From 
an Occidental perspective, this solution is legitimate in view of the arrangements in the 
Roman Empire. 
Second, both manifold Indigenous American concepts categorized as ethics 
and law in the Occident, and Occidental ethics and law are considered equal. If 
clashes between the two arise, then the conflict of ethics is resolved with the use of 
principles modelled on the legal principles used in the case of conflict of laws, 
particularly nationality versus territoriality, judicial restraint, transnationalism, ordre 
public, crown act of state, renvoi, proximité, and ius cogens. From an Occidental 
standpoint, this solution is legitimized by the arrangements in the Germanic kingdoms. 
In order to work, the equality of manifold Indigenous American concepts 
categorized as ethics and law in the Occident, and Occidental ethics and law requires 
that the equality is accepted as ius cogens on all sides. Because of the lack of clear 
territorial boundaries between Indigenous Americans and Occidentals in settler 
colonies, territoriality is unworkable. This means equality but not sameness of 
indigenous Americans and Occidentals. The principles of judicial restraint and renvoi 
require in ethics and law that Occidentals refrain from attempts to influence ethical and 
legal assessments by Indigenous Americans. The application of the principle of 
proximité in ethics and law may be effectively limited to negotiations between 
Indigenous American nations and Occidental government bodies. 
The discourse on Indigenous Americans is different from minority rights in one 
important point according to d'Errico (1999, p. 9): Indigenous Americans are claiming 
a separate domain thus making the discourse into one on sovereignty.  There is no 
fundamental ground to reject the division of sovereignty within a state (Robbins, 2010, 
pp. 258-261). This would allow the formation of more or less sovereign Indigenous 
American nations within a state. Such a solution contains three flaws. First, Indigenous 
Americans have legal and legitimate claims to all of the Americas. Second, an 
establishment of Indigenous American nations within a state would create the 
challenge with the associated discrimination against Indigenous Americans not living 
within the boundaries of these entities –e.g., reserves. Third, the colonial boundaries 
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separate Indigenous American nations, e.g., the Aymara live in Bolivia, Chile and Peru, 
and the Maya live in Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and El Salvador. Therefore, 
sovereign Indigenous American nations and Occidental states exist interlocked and 
simultaneously in the Americas. 
To wrap up: In settler colonalism, decoloniality means added complexity in the 
navigation of ethical and legal issues. Firms cannot rely on democratic, Habermasian 
and Rawlsian processes to yield outcomes that are congruent with Indigenous 
American concepts categorized as ethics and law in the Occident because of settler 
colonialism. Firms’ compliance with Occidental law may be unethical if this violates 
Indigenous American concepts categorized as ethics and law in the Occident.  
Decoloniality in settler colonies requires from firms complex analyses as to what is 
acceptable by both Indigenous American concepts categorized as ethics in the 
Occident and Occidental ethics. Firms need to deal with interlocked sovereign 
Indigenous American nations and sovereign Occidental states in the Americas. An 
increasingly important ethical challenge is to incorporate the interlock and simultaneity 
into artificial intelligence. 
5. Conclusion 
The objective of this paper is to develop and present a novel approach to the conflict 
of ethics on the foundation of legal theory, particularly the legal rules governing conflict 
of law. The focus of this paper is the conflict of ethics impacting Indigenous Americans. 
Whereas the Indigenous American experience is characterized by settler colonialism, 
the dynamics of racism, and cultural and epistemic racism are different from those 
found in Africa and Asia. 
This paper contains three major contributions. First, the interplay between 
Indigenous American concepts categorized as ethics in the Occident and Occidental 
ethics in a settler colonial context is assessed. Second, Occidental concepts in Roman 
Law and Saint Thomas Aquinas’ natural law are used to determine the precedence of 
Indigenous American concepts categorized as ethics in the Occident. Third, rules-
based solutions derived from conflict of laws in international law are applied to conflict 
of ethics in the settler colonial context are synthetized. 
Additional research is required on four issues. First, research into manifold 
Indigenous American concepts categorized as ethics and law in the Occident are still 
in their infancy and require more attention in ethics and legal research. Second, 
research into Indigenous American oral traditions has received limited attention in 
ethics and legal research, and needs to be developed. Third, corruption and violence 
undermining Indigenous American concepts categorized as ethics and law in the 
Occident have received insufficient attention in ethics and legal research. Fourth, the 
divergent Indigenous American nations’ concepts on solving territorial conflicts and 
joint use need to be studied. 
Determining that the conquest of the Americas was illegal and legitimizing the 
resulting status quo as a fait accompli as done by Alonso de la Vera Cruz and 
Francisco de Vitoria raises ethically troubling issues. It is incumbent on ethics and 
legal research to find ways to eliminate the racism, and cultural and epistemic racism 
directed against Indigenous American nations by settler colonialism. 
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